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Abstract: This paper investigates the empirical relationship between corruption, economic growth, 
and government spending in fourteen transitioning economies from 1995-2013. We fi nd 
strong evidence of bilateral Granger causation between economic growth and corruption 
for the full sample but weaker evidence of such a relationship for four former Yugoslav 
republics. We also fi nd bilateral Granger causality between government spending and cor-
ruption but a weaker unidirectional Granger causality from government spending to cor-
ruption in four former Yugoslav republics. Our results recommend caution when assuming 
that corruption is purely exogenous in empirical models.
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Introduction
A large literature connects (public) corruption with economic growth through vari-
ous mechanisms. On the one hand, corruption can be thought to “grease the wheels” 
and enhance economic growth by minimizing bureaucratic red-tape and interference 
with private economic activity (see, for example, Leff, 1964, or Nye, 1967). On the 
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other hand, corruption can be thought to “sand the wheels” and reduce economic 
growth by extracting rents and diverting otherwise productive resources toward pub-
lic offi cials (see, for example, Kreuger, 1974, or Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997). Previous 
empirical studies that make a link between corruption and economic growth often 
use corruption as an exogenous explanatory variable (for example, Mo, 2001, and 
Meon and Sekkat, 2005). However, several studies empirically investigate the cor-
relates of corruption, suggesting that corruption might be endogenous (for example, 
Torrez, 2002, Gatti, 2004, and Zakaria, 2009). 
The contribution of this paper is to investigate the intertemporal relationship be-
tween corruption, economic growth, and government spending for fourteen transi-
tioning economies over the period 1995-2013. In transitioning economies, corruption 
might be “caused” by economic growth if there is less oversight during boom times. 
On the other hand, transitioning economies might experience more corruption as 
government spending increases. To the extent that corruption is non-trivial, it can 
have reverse causality on either economic growth or government spending. These 
relationships are tested using panel Granger causality tests. 
Granger causality is most often employed on lengthy time series. Unfortunately, 
in the case of transitioning economies there is a paucity of reliable data before and 
after transitions occurred. Thus, any individual country’s time series used to test 
Granger causality would be too short. To get around this limitation in the data, we 
employ panel-data Granger Causality tests developed by Hurlin (2005) and Dumi-
trescu and Hurlin (2012). We fi nd that the Granger causal links between corruption, 
economic growth, and government spending are more nuanced than previously as-
sumed. Our results recommend caution when assuming corruption is an exogenous 
regressor in empirical studies. 
A Brief Literature Review
Public corruption often meets moral and legal disapproval but the direct economic 
impact of public corruption is ambiguous. Leff (1964) defi nes public corruption as 
one group infl uencing the actions of a state bureaucracy more than they otherwise 
would. Thus, the direct impact of corruption is not necessarily negative. For exam-
ple, businesses that would otherwise be deterred from investing locally might be 
more prone to do so if they can infl uence decision-makers below the highest levels 
of government. Thus, corruption might extract resources to maintain a “hands off” 
approach to private decision making and thus corruption might be linked to higher 
economic growth. 
On the other hand, public corruption might simply extract or divert otherwise 
productive resources toward public offi cials without an accompanying increase in 
economic activity. Public corruption could correspond to negative economic growth 
115Corruption in Transition Economies: Cause or Effect?
if suffi cient resources are shifted from the private sector to a select few corrupt offi -
cials (see, for example, Kreuger, 1974, or Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997).
Public corruption is thought to harm a local or national economy if bureaucrats 
have the incentive and the ability to divert resources from productive to unproductive 
or even counterproductive purposes. A classic example is rent-seeking bureaucrats 
who create hold-up problems for new business or construction projects, divert public 
resources to family or cronies, or approve projects that benefi t themselves or specifi c 
constituencies. Kreuger (1974) suggests that regulations on private economic activity 
can encourage competitive rent seeking by those directly affected by the regulations 
which leads to unambiguous reduction in social welfare. Myrdal (1968) and Mauro 
(1995) point out that bureaucrats have an incentive to pass more regulations than are 
socially optimal to increase the number of opportunities in which a bribe or other 
tribute can be exacted. 
Ironically, the worse an economy performs the more likely a political regime will 
be ousted, either violently or through elections. This can reduce the time horizon of 
lower-level bureaucrats, if they fear they will lose their jobs sooner than later, which 
increases the incentives to divert more resources to themselves (Mauro, 1995). 
In a mixed economy, bureaucrats have an incentive to partner with existing fi rms 
to increase barriers to entry, to raise operating costs, and to delay permissions to 
potential entrants to generate monopoly rents for incumbent fi rms from which tribute 
can be extracted, at the cost of less product variety and higher prices (Bliss and Tella, 
1997).  
Depken and LaFountain (2006) and others have shown that there are pecuniary 
penalties for public corruption that accrue in the area of state and national debt as 
higher corruption is correlated with lower bond ratings and higher interest rates, all 
else equal. Yet other studies show that public corruption correlates with income in-
equality (Gupta et al., 2002), impacts the percent of paved roads in good condition 
(Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997), correlates with increased school dropout rates (Gupta et 
al., 2000), can increase child mortality (Gupta et al, 2000), and reduces human devel-
opment as measured by the United Nations (Akcay, 2006).1 
In the human capital arena, as the returns to corruption increase, the competi-
tion to enter the bureaucrat class and collect available rents can provide an incentive 
to over-invest in political capital (Ehrlich and Lui, 1999). While public goods are 
ostensibly non-rivalrous and non-excludable, governments provide many goods and 
services that are funded by public monies, such as stadiums, highways, public hous-
ing. All such projects provide many opportunities for bureaucrats to steer business 
to cronies who then collect rents through higher prices and lower quality (Schleifer 
and Vishny, 1993). Mo (2001) fi nds that corruption reduces the incentive for private 
investment in human and physical capital. 
Hodge et al. (2011) argue that the impact of corruption on economic growth is 
the net effect of the positive and negative effects of corruption on economic activity. 
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They fi nd that corruption has a robust net negative impact on economic growth and 
that the impact of corruption is positively related to governance levels and, somewhat 
counter-intuitively, deregulation. They point out that there does not seem to be a 
single policy that could be applied to public corruption in all instances and obtain 
the same results. This suggests that each country’s experience with public corruption 
is somewhat unique, perhaps because of different institutions, social norms, and bu-
reaucratic history. This intuition is supported by Meon and Sekkat (2005) who fi nd 
that corruption has positive and negative infl uences on economic growth depending 
on the quality of governance in a country. 
While many studies consider corruption as an exogenous regressor, several papers 
treat corruption as endogenous. Mauro (1995) treats corruption as an endogenous 
regressor in an economic growth model, using ethnolinguistic fractionalization as 
an instrument. Using cross-sectional data from the mid-1980s, he fi nds that corrup-
tion directly reduces GDP growth but also indirectly reduces GDP growth by reduc-
ing various measures of total investment.2 Torrez (2002), Gatti (2004), and Zakaria 
(2009) model corruption as a function of trade openness and other macroeconomic 
and demographic variables. They fi nd that trade openness and human capital is as-
sociated with reduced corruption but that government expenditure and population 
are associated with increased corruption. These three studies are closely related to 
this study because we consider the possibility that corruption, economic growth, and 
government spending are all endogenous because they Granger cause each other. 
Methodology
The concept of Granger Causality has been used to consider the relationship between 
time series variables. While the methodology suggested by Granger (1969) estab-
lishes causality in the broadest sense of the term, the application of the methodology 
has ranged from causality of sun spots and economic growth (where Sheehan and 
Grieves (1982) show that economic growth Granger cause sun spots) to the timeless 
question of which came fi rst the chicken or the egg? (Thurman and Fisher (1988) 
show that it was the egg). This paper investigates the relationship between corrup-
tion, government spending, and economic growth focusing on fourteen transitioning 
economies starting from mid-1990s. Because of limited data availability, we utilize 
a panel-data Granger causality test developed by Hurlin and Venet (2001), Hurlin 
(2005), and Dumitrescu and Hurlin (2012), and implemented by Hoffmann et al. 
(2005), Hood et al. (2008), and Chen et al. (2013). 
The methodology is straightforward. First, the data are tested for unit roots. Fol-
lowing Granger and Newbold (1977), all variables that are non-stationary are differ-
enced until stationary. Next, a panel model is estimated with group fi xed effects and 
a chosen number of autoregressive terms of the dependent variable (typically ranging 
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from one to three).3 The parameters on the autoregressive terms are free to take any 
values. Finally, a chosen number of lagged values of the additional variable are also 
included where the parameters within any group are restricted to be the same: 
(1)
where v is a white noise error term, ai are country fi xed effects, gik and the and bik can 
differ across countries but are assumed constant for all k Œ [1, p] (see Hurlin, 2005, 
and Hurlin and Venet, 2008). The test for panel Granger causality between x and y is 
a test of the null hypothesis that all bi = 0 for all i. The “unrestricted” model is that 
provided in equation (1) above. The restricted model sets all bi = 0 so that the number 
of restrictions equals Np, where N is the number of groups and p is the number of 
lags, and the unrestricted model has NT-N(1+p)-p degrees of freedom. 
Having estimated the unrestricted and the restricted models and obtaining associ-
ated sum of squared errors, the test of the null of no Granger causality is determined 
using the following F-distributed test statistic:
A failure to reject the restrictions indicates that there is no Granger causality 
between x and y and no further investigation is required. However, if one rejects 
the null of no Granger causality, the next question is whether the causal relationship 
is homogeneous for all groups or if some causal relationships between x and y are 
heterogeneous.
A test for homogeneous causality asks whether the betas are equal across all 
groups. This imposes Np-1 restrictions on the model. Obtaining the sum of squared 
errors from this restricted model (RSS2R) allows for the calculation of the following 
F-distributed test statistic:
Failure to reject the null indicates that there is homogeneous causality across all 
groups, rejection suggests that one or more groups have different causal relationships 
between x and y.
Finally, just as in non-panel Granger causal relationships, it is possible for Grang-
er causality to be unilateral between x and y, unilateral between y and x, bilateral 
between x and y, or to be non-existent between x and y. To test whether y Granger 
causes x, we reverse the roles of x and y and implement the same methodology again. 
We implement bidirectional tests of Granger causality between corruption and GDP 
growth, and corruption and government spending using one, two and three lags. 
ݕ௜௧ ൌ ߙ௜ ൅ σ ߛ௜௞ݕ௜௧ି௞ ൅ σ ߚ௜௞ݔ௜௧ି௞ ൅ ݒ௜௧௣௞ୀଵ௣௞ୀଵ , 
ܨଵ ൌ
ሺܴܵܵோ െ ܴܵܵ௎ோሻȀܰ݌
ሺܴܵܵ௎ோሻȀሺܰܶ െ ܰሺͳ ൅ ݌ሻ െ ݌ሻǤ
ܨଶ ൌ
ሺܴܵܵʹோ െ ܴܵܵ௎ோሻȀሺܰ݌ െ ͳሻ
ܴܵܵ௎ோȀሺܰܶ െ ܰሺͳ ൅ ݌ሻ െ ݌ሻǤ
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Data
The data employed in this analysis come from two primary sources. Corruption is 
measured using the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index (here-
after CPI), which is a composite of public surveys of how corrupt a country is. His-
torically, the CPI was measured on a scale of 0-10 but lately has been measured on a 
scale of 0 to 100; we maintain the 0-10 scale for the purposes of this study. In the CPI, 
zero would correspond to the greatest amount of corruption and a ten would corre-
spond to the least amount of corruption. Economic growth is calculated as the annual 
percentage increase in annual gross domestic product as reported by the United Na-
tions World Development Index. The amount of government spending as a percent-
age of national GDP is reported by the United Nations World Development Index. 
The countries included in the sample are reported in Table 1 and descriptive sta-
tistics are reported in Table 2. The average annual growth rate of GDP in the broad 
sample of fourteen transitioning economies is 3.01% and the average corruption score 
is 4.696. Among the subsample of four former Yugoslav republics for which data are 
available, average growth rate was 2.4% and average corruption score is 3.661 (zero 
is most corrupt and ten is least corrupt). Those who contribute to the Transparency 
International corruption index view the four former Yugoslav republics as slightly 
more corrupt than the other countries in the sample, although the difference in the 
average corruption scores is less than one standard deviation.4




Czech Republic Macedonia Slovak Republic
Estonia Montenegro
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics
All Countries in Sample
Variable Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum
GDP Growth (Annual Percentage) 0.031 0.045 -0.171 0.143
Corruption 4.696 1.331 2.6 8.7
Government Spending (%GDP) 19.06 3.95 5.69 a 29.94b
Former Yugoslav Republics
GDP Growth (Annual Percentage) 0.024 0.035 -0.071 0.087
Corruption 3.661 0.567 2.7 4.8
Government Spending (%GDP) 21.09 2.60 17.11 29.94
Notes: Corruption measured on a scale of 0-10 where 10 is least corrupt and 0 is most corrupt. Sample 
comprised of 186 observations. a Romania in 1999. b Montenegro in 2005.
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Results
The results of the panel-data Granger causality tests are for two sets of null hypoth-
eses: that corruption does not Granger cause economic growth, and vice-versa, and 
that government spending as a percentage of GDP does not Granger cause corruption 
and vice-versa. These tests are undertaken for the larger sample of fourteen transi-
tioning economies and for a subsample of four former Yugoslav republics for which 
we have data. The results are reported in Table 3 and Table 4. 
Table 3: Panel Granger Causality Test Results
GDP Growth Æ Corruption Corruption Æ GDP Growth
1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag
All Countries in Sample 2.248** 0.715 0.443 1.901** 1.144 0.668
Former Yugoslav Republics 0.462 0.235 4.308** 0.905 0.504 1.976**
Government Spending Æ Corruption Corruption Æ Government Spending
All Countries in Sample 4.779** 1.635 1.181 3.499** 1.152 0.483
Former Yugoslav Republics 1.168 0.312 4.554** 0.433 0.666 0.996
Notes: Æ indicates direction of Granger causality. Null hypothesis is no Granger causality. F-statistics reported. 
Rejection of null hypothesis suggests evidence of Granger causality. ** p<0.05
Table 4: Homogeneous Causal Relationships
GDP Growth Æ Corruption Corruption Æ GDP Growth
1 lag 2 lag 3 lag 1 lag 2 lag 3 lag
All Countries in Sample 1.696 1.982
Former Yugoslav Republics 4.418** 1.753
Government Spending Æ Corruption Corruption Æ Government Spending
All Countries in Sample 4.578** 3.077**
Former Yugoslav Republics 4.839**
Notes: Æ indicates direction of Granger causality. Null hypothesis is that all causal relationships are 
homogeneous across countries. F-statistics reported. Cells in bold correspond to evidence of Granger Causality 
in Table 3. ** p<0.05
There appears to be bilateral Granger causality between economic growth and 
corruption when using one lag but the causal link disappears when including two 
or three lags. On the other hand, for the former Yugoslav republics in the sample 
economic growth does appear to Granger cause corruption but only when including 
three lags. We see a similar pattern when looking at corruption Granger causing eco-
nomic growth. In the broader sample of countries, a causal link appears when using 
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the fi rst lag but there is no causal relationship when including two or three lags. Cor-
ruption does not Granger cause economic growth in the four former Yugoslav repub-
lics when using one or two lags but a causal link appears when including three lags. 
In the full sample, we fi nd bilateral causation between government spending and 
corruption when using one lag but the causal relationship disappears when using 
two or three lags. In the smaller group of former Yugoslav republics, government 
spending does not Granger cause corruption when using one or two lags but a causal 
relationship appears when using three lags. In the smaller sample, corruption does 
not have a causal link to government spending when using one, two, or three lags. 
The results in Table 3 restrict the causal relationships between any two variables 
to be homogeneous across the fourteen countries in the sample. Table 4 reports tests 
for homogeneous causal relationships for all cases where Granger causality was sta-
tistically meaningful in Table 3. For the two cases where economic growth displayed 
a causal link with corruption, the evidence suggests that the causal relationships are 
homogeneous in the case of the broader sample of countries but heterogeneous in 
the case of the former Yugoslav republics. In the case of corruption Granger causing 
economic growth, there is weak evidence of heterogeneous causal relationships in 
the broader sample of countries but no evidence among the former Yugoslav repub-
lics in the sample. For the case of government spending Granger causing corruption, 
the evidence suggests heterogeneous causal relationships in the broader sample of 
counties and in the case of the former Yugoslav republics. For the case of corruption 
Granger causing government spending, the evidence suggests heterogeneous causal 
relationships among the broader sample of countries. 
Our time-series evidence supports the evidence of a bidirectional Granger causal 
link between corruption and economic growth in the transitioning economies in our 
sample spanning 1995-2013. 
Conclusions
In this paper, we test whether corruption, economic growth, and government spend-
ing share a Granger causal relationship in transitioning economies. The literature fo-
cusing on the impacts of public corruption on economic outcomes often assumes cor-
ruption is exogenous to economic growth or some other variable of interest. However, 
it is anecdotally claimed that economic growth or increased government spending 
in transitioning economies might encourage more public corruption. The bilateral 
relationships between corruption, economic growth, and government spending are 
investigated in this paper.
Using Panel Granger Causality tests developed by Hurlin (2005), we analyze an 
unbalanced panel describing fourteen transitioning economies from 1995-2013 and 
a subsample of four former Yugoslav republics. We analyze the relationship between 
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the perceived corruption of the country as recorded by Transparency International, 
economic growth and government spending. We fi nd some evidence of a bilateral 
Granger causal link between corruption and economic growth when using one year 
lag but the causal links disappear when using two or three lags. On the other hand, 
in the subsample of former Yugoslav republics, there is bilateral Granger causality 
when using three lags but not when using one or two lags. 
We fi nd evidence of bilateral Granger causation between government spending 
and corruption in the broader sample of countries when using one lag but not when 
using two or three. In the subsample of former Yugoslav republics, we fi nd unilateral 
Granger causation from government spending to corruption when using three lags 
but not when using one or two lags. 
We test for homogeneous causal relationships and fi nd that in fi ve of the sev-
en instances where we fi nd Granger causality the relationships across the various 
countries cannot be considered homogeneous. This suggests that the relationships 
between corruption, economic growth, and government spending are more nuanced 
than previous studies have assumed. It might be the case that corruption is related to 
economic growth, on average, but the relationship might be more idiosyncratic than 
previously thought. 
The different temporal relationships between corruption and economic growth in 
the former Yugoslav republics invite future research. In particular, while the broader 
sample of countries seems to have causal relationships that are statistically meaning-
ful when using a one-year lag to explain current year values of corruption, economic 
growth, and government spending, the former Yugoslav republics only show these 
relationship when using three lags. The source for what appears to be slower trans-
mission mechanisms between corruption, economic growth, and government spend-
ing in this subsample of countries is an avenue for future research. 
While there might be concerns that transitioning economies are particularly sus-
ceptible to public corruption because such corruption is encouraged by either eco-
nomic growth or increased government spending, there is little evidence to support 
such an assertion beyond a single year. This does not imply that corruption is not a 
concern for public policy but that the transmission mechanisms appear to be rela-
tively short term in nature. Notwithstanding high profi le corruption cases that occur 
in transitioning economies, the results here invite comparison with the intertempo-
ral relationships between corruption, economic growth, and government spending 
in more developed countries.  Future research might also better distinguish between 
corruption and corruption opportunities in transitioning economies associated with 
economic growth and that associated with increased government spending.
Given the perceived and actual importance of public corruption on economic ac-
tivity it is important that empirical studies provide reliable results that can help guide 
public debate and public policy. Our empirical results suggest that caution should be 
used when assuming that corruption is a strictly exogenous regressor in any empir-
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ical models. Because of the possibility of reverse causality, ordinary least squares 
regressions that do not control for potential endogeneity of corruption run the risk of 
providing biased and inconsistent parameter estimates which might infl uence infer-
ence and interpretation. 
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NOTES
1  See Akcay (2006) for a review. 
2  Using similar data, Mauro (1997) fi nds that corruption infl uences the composition of government 
spending, most obviously by reducing public expenditure on education. 
3  Among the fi rst three lags considered here, the AIC and BIC are minimized with one lag. However, 
we include up to three lags to be consistent with the original studies that implement this methodology. 
4  We implemented Phillips-Perron panel-data unit root tests with one, two, and three lags and includ-
ing a time trend. All three variables were trend stationary in each test .

